(1)

On 31 May 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/255/CFSP (1).

(2)

On 27 May 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/1510 (2) extending the restrictive measures set out in Decision 2013/255/CFSP until 1 June 2025.

(3)

Following the fall of al-Assad’s regime in Syria, on 24 February 2025, the Council eased a number of Union restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria in order to facilitate engagement with the country, its people and businesses in the areas of energy, transport and reconstruction, as well as to facilitate the associated financial and banking transactions.

(4)

On the same day, the Council issued a declaration stating that listings related to the al-Assad regime, the chemical weapons sector and illicit drug trade should be maintained. The Council also declared that it will continue to examine whether the suspensions remain appropriate, based on the close monitoring of the situation in the country, and it will consider the steps taken by Syria for an inclusive transition in line with the declarations of the transitional authorities, including accountability for the al-Assad regime’s crimes, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Syrians without distinction of any kind, and rule of law and international law. The Council called for an end to interference in the country of destabilising foreign actors, recalling the respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Syria.

(5)

On 20 March 2025, the European Council underlined the importance of a peaceful and inclusive transition in Syria, free from harmful foreign interference, and the protection of the rights of Syrians from all ethnic and religious backgrounds without discrimination. The European Council also highlighted that comprehensive transitional justice in particular is essential on the path to reconciliation. The European Council outlined the Union’s suspension of restrictive measures as part of a gradual, reversible approach on the basis of close monitoring of the situation in Syria.

(6)

On 20 May 2025, the Council announced its political decision to lift its economic sanctions on Syria, to support the Syrian people in reuniting and rebuilding a new, inclusive, pluralistic and peaceful Syria free from harmful foreign interference.

(7)

On this basis, the Council considers that all sectoral restrictive measures should be lifted, with the exception of those based on security grounds.

(8)

Despite the fall of the al-Assad regime and the establishment of the transitional authorities, the situation in Syria remains unstable and al-Assad’s network, spread inside and outside Syria, has not yet been held accountable and cannot be considered dissolved. There remains a credible risk of destabilisation and a potential resurgence of the former regime’s influence, exemplified by the incidents in support of the al-Assad regime aimed at undermining the transitional process, that have led to deadly violence in Syria’s coastal region. Listed individuals and entities linked to the al-Assad regime continue to hold powerful influential roles and pose a risk of supporting, through financing or other means, further armed conflict, and may play a part in attempts to reverse the transition. In her statement of 11 March 2025 on behalf of the Union, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy expressed grave concerns about the widespread violence in Syria’s coastal region and strongly condemned the attacks by pro-Assad militias against security forces and the horrific crimes committed against civilians, including summary killings, and stressed in this regard that effective measures must be taken to prevent such crimes from happening again.

(9)

Members of the al-Assad and Makhlouf families and associated individuals have yet to be held accountable for their involvement in the brutal repression against the civilian population in Syria and pose a risk of trying to escalate conflict and hinder the peaceful transition in Syria.

(10)

Syrian Government Ministers in power after May 2011 under the former al-Assad regime are to be considered jointly and severally responsible for the policy of repression pursued by the former al-Assad regime and continue to pose a risk to the peaceful transition in Syria.

(11)

Militias, armed groups, security forces and intelligence bodies connected to the former al-Assad regime and loyal to the former regime pose a risk of further escalation and repression against the civilian population in Syria.

(12)

More than 100 suspected chemical weapons sites remain in Syria after the fall of the al-Assad regime, a number much higher than ever acknowledged before the fall of the al-Assad regime. The destruction of Syria’s remaining chemical weapons stockpiles remains a priority to ensure the protection of the Syrian population, as outlined in the conclusions of the European Council of 19 December 2024.

(13)

Leading businesspersons operating in Syria linked to the al-Assad regime and who have amassed substantial wealth and power due to this connection remain influential and their networks have stayed in place. As such, these individuals carry an inherent risk of violent repression of the civil society and the peaceful transition in Syria.

(14)

On the basis of a review of Decision 2013/255/CFSP, the restrictive measures set out therein should be extended until 1 June 2026.

(15)

Decision 2013/255/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

in Article 27, paragraphs 1 and 2 are replaced by the following:

(*1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1836 of 12 October 2015 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ L 266, 13.10.2015, p. 75, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2015/1836/oj)."

(*2)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1096 of 27 May 2025 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ L, 2025/1096, 28.5.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1096/oj).’;"

(2)

Article 28 is amended as follows:

(3)

Article 28a is amended as follows:

(4)

Article 29 is replaced by the following:

(5)

in Article 30, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

(6)

Article 31 is replaced by the following:

(7)

Article 34 is replaced by the following:

(8)

Articles 5, 6, 7, 7a, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 28b are deleted;

(9)

Annex II is deleted;

(10)

Annex III is deleted.